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Abstract. 
In this dissertation I will assess the impact that an outright ban on labour brokers would 
have on the agricultural sector in the Western Cape, and more specifically on the wine 
farms in this region. By utilising both existing, and original research, I will examine how 
the existing definitions of ‘decent work’ compare with the reality of workers’ lives 
within this sector, bearing in mind the somewhat unique working relationship that exists 
between these farmers and their workers1. Special attention to the regulatory frameworks 
that our current legislation, particularly section 198 of the LRA,2 section 82 of the 
BCEA,3 the SDA4 and COIDA5 provide for in terms of regulating and enforcing 
standards within the labour broking industry, and an overview of the current labour 
economics within this sector will help us to understand how the ‘price of this labour’ 
(wages) is determined, and what degree of social security is provided for these workers. 
This will in turn allow us to explore the legitimacy of claims that labour broking 
substitutes and subverts the supply of decent jobs, ‘de-skills’ the workforce, denies them 
their constitutional right to collective bargaining6 and ultimately undermines their entire 
social security entitlement.  
 
Careful consideration of all this information will then allow us to take a firm position on 
what the impact on the Western Cape agricultural sector would be if an outright ban on 
labour broking was imposed, whilst also allowing us to plot a potential way forward. 
                                                   
1 Primarily as a result of their historical interdependency on one another and the inequality in bargaining 
power that has always characterised this relationship. 
2 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
3 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
4 Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. 
5 Compensation for Occupational Injury and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
6 Section 22 of the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. (1996). 
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Section 1: An introduction to the changing face of work. 
 
The provision of ‘decent work’7 is fast becoming the holy grail of sustainable socio-
economic development frameworks around the world. Labour law legislators and 
governmental departments across the globe continue to grapple with the inherently 
dichotomous stand- off that exists between the economic viability of providing a skilled, 
motivated and flexible workforce, and the undeniable costs linked to the provision of a 
social justice and security system that can effectively protect this workforce. 
 
Right now in South Africa we have both, the Minister of Labour,8 and the countries’ 
largest trade union9 calling for an outright ban on labour broking because they believe 
that this  form of triangulated employment is based purely on commercial greed, and has 
turned the provision of labour into ‘a form of human trafficking’.10  
 
When the spotlight is turned onto the agricultural sector, some interesting facts emerge. 
Whilst the income earned from agricultural activity only accounts for about 4% of South 
Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it does account for some 10% of the countries’ 
total reported employment.11 Approximately 57 000 large scale commercial farming 
enterprises employ in excess of 1 million permanent labourers, whilst another 240 000 
small scale farmers provide a livelihood to around 1 million family members, and 
                                                   
7 As defined by the International Labour Organization’s Decent Work Agenda published in July 2006. 
8 Mr. Membathisi Mdadlana. 
9 Congress of South African Trade Unions. (COSATU) 
10 Minister of Labour’s reaction to Department of Labour research (2009) that employees engaged by 
labour brokers were paid significantly less than permanently employed employees, in spite of the fact that 
they were all doing the same work.   
11 www.OCED.org (Review of Agricultural policies – South Africa. April 2006.) 
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‘occasional employment’12 to another 500 000 people. In addition to that, there are an 
estimated 3 million subsistence farming operations spread throughout the country.13 
 
South Africa’s wine industry is concentrated in the Western Cape and has over 3 800 
farmers producing grapes. In global production terms this makes us the 7th biggest 
producers of certified wine, albeit that we only produce about 3, 6% of the world’s 
wine.14 (Whilst we produce just over 1 billion litres of wine, the French produce in 
excess of 5,34 billion litres – And our modest consumption of just 7,5 litres per capita is 
dwarfed by the Gaul’s consistent per capita figure of 53,9 litres.)15   
The wine and fruit industry in the Western Cape employs around 200 000 people, of 
which approximately 60% are seasonal (not full-time or permanent) workers.16 Our 
participation within global markets demands that our products are internationally 
competitive, and that, combined with the ever increasing mechanisation on our farms 
has led to a larger and larger demand for flexible workforces. This growing trend in 
casualisation has seen a comparative increase in the number of registered labour brokers. 
(This is evidenced by the fact that in 1996 there were just over 50 registered labour 
brokers, and just 8 years later that number had risen to over 200.)17  
 
Labour brokers undoubtedly play an integral role within the Western Cape agricultural 
labour market. But before we can accurately quantify the extent of their influence we 
need to understand how they evolved within the overall labour force demand framework. 
                                                   
12 This term describes work done on a largely unregulated, sporadic and part-time basis.  
13 www.sirtewaterandenergy.org (National Investment Brief – South Africa. December 2008.) 
14 www.sawis.co.za (S.A. Wine Industry Statistics – 2009.) 
15 Ibid. 
16 www.OCED.org  
17 Theron, J et al. (2005) The rise of labour broking and it’s policy implications. Development and Labour 
Law Monographs 1/2005, Institute of Development and Labour Law, University of Cape Town. 
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Section 2: ‘Decent Work’ - What is it, and how does it fit into the 
typical agricultural workers context? 
 
By definition, farming’s seasonal workloads demand the utilisation of seasonal labour. 
 
The protection of agricultural workers rights, and their ability to defend themselves 
against unfair labour practices, have been specifically addressed by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) for over eighty years now – ever since they first published 
their Right of Association (Agricultural) Convention (No 11) in 1921. Thereafter 
individual conventions relating to farm workers rights to sickness insurance, 18 old age 
insurance, 19 minimum wages, 20 holidays with pay,21 and health and safety 22 guarantees 
have all been published.  
 
Over the past twenty years there has been an enormous groundswell of economic and 
social change throughout the world. This globalisation has significantly altered the 
nature of work and the relationships binding employees and their employers. The 
consequent casualisation of labour has dramatically affected the access that employees 
have to social security, essentially making workers more vulnerable and employers less 
                                                   
18 Sickness Insurance Convention 1927 (No 25). 
19 Old Age Insurance Convention 1933 (No 36). 
20 Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery Convention 1951 (No 99). 
21 Holidays with Pay Convention 1952 (No 101). 
22 Safety and Health in Agriculture Convention 2001 (184). 
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accountable. The ILO’s response to this has been to publish the Private Employment 
Agencies Convention23 and the Decent Work Agenda.24   
 
Our own labour legislation in South Africa has made quantum leaps in terms of 
redressing previously entrenched racial discrimination, and has also developed dedicated 
legislation pertaining to the triangulated employment relationships25 that have evolved 
from the aforementioned casualisation.  It is amongst these casual, informal, seasonal, 
short term, part-time, sub-contracted and outsourced forms of ‘atypical’ employees that 
the labour broking industry has evolved, into the estimated 500 000 strong, R26 billion 
industry26 that is today.  
 
The question that remains is how much protection does our current legislation offer to 
these atypical workers, and our seasonal farm worker, in particular?  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
23 Convention 181 of 1997, which controversially sanctions the fact that a labour broker is entitled to offer 
lesser social protection to his/her employees than that provided for in a standard employment relationship. 
It should be noted that South Africa has not ratified this particular Convention. 
24 Announced in 2007, it requires that work is productive, delivers a fair income, and provides security in 
the work place, social protection, better opportunities for personal development, freedom of association 
and equal opportunity for all men and women. (Ref: www.ilo.org.) 
25 Specifically section 198 of the LRA, and section 82 of the BCEA. 
26 www.naledi.org (Research working report – July 2009.) 
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Section 3: Labour brokers within the South African labour context. 
 
In spite of the fact that section 24(1) of the Skills and Development Act (97 of 1998) 
requires that, ‘Any person who wishes to provide employment services for gain must 
apply for registration as a private employment services agency to the Director-General 
in the prescribed manner.’ no one really appears to know just how many active labour 
brokers there are, nor how many people are employed by these brokers. In the small 
Boland town of Grabouw it is estimated that up to 150, mostly unregistered, (‘bakkie 
brigade’) labour brokers are in operation on a daily basis.27 
 
We need to understand how labour broking evolved in South Africa. 
 
Ever since the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa there was a need to 
manage large scale work forces. By 191328 the State had already shown that they were 
willing to create legislation that would allow for the mining houses to secure cheap 
labour. The similarly heavy handed response by General Smut’s government to a 
mineworker strike in 1922 further endorsed the view that labour was essentially there for 
the benefit of the employers.  
 
Even though labour brokers had become a firmly established part of the labour market 
during the fist half of the 1900’s, it wasn’t until the 1983 amendments to the definition 
of an employee in the LRA29 that ‘labour brokers’ were legally defined as the employers 
of any workers that they had placed at their Clients premises. (Based on the proviso that 
                                                   
27 www.crls.org.za Briefing Paper: Going for Broke: A case study of labour brokerage on fruit farms in 
Grabouw. (2008) 
28 Native Land Act. (27 of 1913.) 
29 Labour Relations Amendment Act 2 of 1983. 
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the broker was the one that paid the worker his/her remuneration.) By 1995 the LRA 
(Act 66 of 1995) had renamed these labour brokers, ‘temporary employment services’ 
(TES’s).This legitimized triangular employment relationship was carefully structured to 
create an equitable balance between the flexibility that modern economies demanded of 
employment relationships, whilst still providing an acceptable level of social security. 
Having said that, it still clearly ‘commodifed’ the workers contribution. These TES’s 
were still defined as the workers employer, however the Clients were now made jointly 
and severally liable for breaches of the BCEA30, any sectoral determinations, collective 
agreements and arbitration awards. Unfortunately this joint liability never included any 
protection against unfair dismissal. It was also somewhat self defeating in that any legal 
proceedings in the Labour Court, and CCMA,31 remained restricted to ‘employees’ and 
‘employers’ alone. This procedural restriction clearly stopped any workers from taking 
legal action against their Clients, since these Clients were not deemed to be their 
employers.32 Consequently the workers vulnerability to being summararily withdrawn 
from the Clients workforce, as well as their inherent lack of social security provision 
remained in place.  
 
This development of a two tier labour market was formally introduced by the South 
African Foundation in 1996. It was suggested that the first tier be made up of all those 
people employed in the formal sector. In other words, it would include all those people 
that had a standard employment contract which provided them with comprehensive 
employment condition guarantees, protection against unfair labour practices and 
significant social security benefits including sick/maternity leave, compensation for 
injuries, severance pay, unemployment insurance and provident fund membership.  
 
                                                   
30 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
31 Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration. Established 1996. 
32 April v Workforce Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a The Workforce Group (2005) 26 ILJ 2224 (CCMA). 
The CCMA was found to have no inherent, or given, power to declare contractual terms invalid. 
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The second tier of worker was created to absorb all those people who could not find jobs 
in the formal sector, and had been forced into accepting work in the informal sector. 
This informal sector however, contained no regulatory frameworks, or employee 
protection whatsoever, and was consequently characterised by exploitation and abuse. 
Based on the fact that the cost of employing people in this first tier was too high to be 
financially viable across the entire labour force, it was proposed that these second tier 
workers should ‘operate under an amended legal regime.’33 This amended regime 
would allow employers to escape the costs associated with first tier employee protection 
and rights, whilst still affording these previously unprotected informal workers some 
degree of fundamental working condition standards and basic protections. Those 
legislators that were initially opposed to the idea of having two different bodies of 
labour law, had to concede that the overall benefits available from even an amended set 
of legal rights would provide people working in the informal sector with a significantly 
enhanced status. Temporary employment services (TES’s) were developed specifically 
to launch and sustain this two tier labour market.  
 
The Skills Development Act (SDA) currently defines labour brokers as ‘private 
employment service agencies’ and requires them to register as employers with the South 
African Revenue Services, Unemployment Insurance Fund, the Workman’s 
Compensation Fund, Sectoral Education and Training Authorities and Bargaining 
Councils. 
 
The Employment Equity Act (55 of 1998) requires that the Client and the labour broker 
(now legally renamed a TES), be jointly and severally liable for any acts of unfair 
discrimination. The other key aspect of this particular piece of legislation that is worth 
                                                   
33 This SAF Report (1996) suggested that these amended rules include, ‘ a bargaining process where rules 
concerning strikes, lock outs etc  influence the level at which parties are eventually prepared to settle’, non 
wage costs such as medical and provident fund provisions, job-security provisions and the costs of 
industrial action. (p 102 – 103.) 
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noting here, is that any affirmative action appointee who is placed at a Client for a 
period exceeding 3 months can also look to the Client as his/her employer.  
 
The Client is also the employer when it comes to compliance under the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act (85 of 1993), but is exempt from ‘employer responsibility’ when 
issues arise pertaining to the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 
(130 of 1993).34 
 
Then, in 2002, amendments to the LRA (Sec 200 A) and the BCEA (Sec 82 A) 
introduced a rebuttable presumption that re-defined the employee/employer relationship 
even further. Eg: If a person worked for more than 40 hours per month for the same 
Client, or was economically dependant on the Client, or if the Client provided the 
workers ‘tools of the trade’, it could be deemed that the worker was entitled to employee 
rights. This effectively stopped TES’s and Clients from trying to pass of employees as 
independent contractors.35 
 
If all these disparate definitions of an ‘employee’ leave you a little confused, then just 
imagine how confused the majority of semi-literate seasonal grape pickers are.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
34 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd. t/a Rockland Poultry v Rieck (2007) 2 SA 118 (SCA) 
35 LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla (2001) 22 ILJ 1813 (LAC). 
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Section 4: A look at the historical development of the labour broker / 
farm worker relationship. 
 
Throughout Africa’s history, colonisation has resulted in the indigenous people being 
dispossessed of their land and forced into, what can best be described as, paternalistic 
relationships with the new land owner. Apartheid in South Africa further expanded this 
systematic displacement of people and entrenched the gross inequality in bargaining 
power between the farm worker and the farm owner. Farm workers who had often 
previously been farmers and landowners themselves were turned into labour tenants.  
 
Fifteen years into post-apartheid South Africa it is indeed sad to see that this gross 
inequality between farmers and their workers has effectively been replaced by a 
similarly disproportionate relationship between the ‘bakkie broker’ and his workers. 
These brokers’ ability to withdraw any worker from his team, without any prior notice 
leaves the workers entirely dependent on the broker. In addition to that, the lack of any 
contractual obligations, in respect of payment on rainy days or public holidays, UIF 
registration, or medical support, and the fact that the workers are often reliant on the 
brokers transport to get to work, has simply re-created the grossly unfair and inhumane 
working conditions that all of our post apartheid labour legislation development has 
endeavored to eradicate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
15 
Section 5: A profile of the role that labour brokers currently play in the 
agricultural sector of the Western Cape. 
 
(5.1) Market overview. 
 
There are two distinctly different ways that a farmer can go about utilising the services 
of labour brokers to provide part-time or seasonal workers. 
 
Established companies such as The Workforce Group, Industaff Solutions, Umkhonto 
Labour Holdings and the Grabouw Labour Bureau are all specialist labour broking 
companies that are run in strict accordance with all the legal guidelines detailed in our 
current labour law legislation.36 Each of these companies is registered as a Temporary 
Employment Service provider, and all of their workers are registered for Unemployment 
Insurance and Workmen’s Compensation. These labour brokers sign written contracts 
with each farmer that they work with, which includes details of the wages to be paid to 
each worker as well as the administrative fee that they charge for the effective 
administration of their employees. The duration of each contract is also clearly specified, 
and is usually based on a weekly/monthly end-date, or alternatively linked to the 
completion of a specific task. In some instances an on-site foreman, or supervisor, is 
included to streamline the day to day management and control of these seasonal 
employees. Productivity bonuses are also often an integral part of these contracts. 
Weekly timesheets are submitted to the Client (farmer) which reconciles the work 
completed by each employee during that week, including any overtime payments due, 
and the deductions required to pay their UIF and Workmen’s Compensation 
subscriptions. Throughout the duration of any contract the farmer will also ensure that 
ablution facilities and a rest/eating area is provided for these employees. 
                                                   
36 LRA, BCEA, EEA, SDA and COIDA. 
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Unfortunately, due to a lack of reporting and enforcement of regulations pertaining to 
the registration of TES’s it is impossible to accurately gauge exactly what share of the 
‘labour broking market’ these established companies control. However, since it does 
appear that their preferred usage is amongst the larger farms (in excess of 80ha) it can be 
fairly conservatively estimated that the majority of farm owners are still utilising the 
services of the ‘bakkie brigade’37 labour brokers. (A detailed description of how this 
’bakkie brigade’ operates is included in the published research discussed below.) 
 
 
(5.2) A review of published, and original, research regarding labour brokers in the 
Western Cape agricultural sector. 
  
The Centre for Rural Legal Studies have recently released the results of their 2007/2008 
research aimed at ‘developing a greater understanding of the specific experiences of 
farm workers in relation to labour brokers.’38 This involved sectoral consultations with 
key role players (trade unions and farm worker civil society organizations), structured 
interviews with farm workers (both permanent and part-time employees), labour 
brokers, farmers, and NGO representatives. 
 
An overall perspective of their findings paints a fairly gloomy picture of non compliance 
and exploitation.  
                                                   
37 In the majority of instances these labour brokers are ex farm workers (foreman or supervisors) who have 
been retrenched and now live in informal settlements, and provide a service to farms within a 30 to 50 km 
radius. (www.crls.org.za carries details of the research sample used to establish this profile.) 
38 Briefing Paper: Going for Broke: A case study of labour brokerage on fruit farms in Grabouw. 
(Available on www.crls.org.za.)  
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The 12 labour brokers interviewed in their survey were all ‘bakkie brigade’ brokers. In 
other words they were all unregistered. None of them had any post school education or 
training. They had all previously been permanent farm workers themselves, but now 
lived in poor conditions in a nearby settlement, and said that they were barely making a 
living.  
 
Workers placed by these brokers are quoted39 as saying that, ‘… at the end of the week I 
come home with just R30.00 ….. We travel on overcrowded bakkies and I once fell off 
the bakkie …. We have no written contracts….we have no guarantee regarding the 
minimum wage to be paid.” 
 
This research, in spite of its obvious skew towards unregistered labour brokers, was 
however able to identify two very interesting demographics that have developed within 
this sector of the labour broking environment.  
 
(1) Almost 40% of these workers are women. This trend towards the ‘feminisation of 
labour’40has been growing steadily within the agricultural sector because it is all too 
easy to offer unskilled work, only required on an irregular basis, to someone that will 
traditionally be prepared to accept a lesser wage. This entrenched gender difference in 
earning is still a very real part of poverty stricken family dynamics in the agricultural 
sector. All their household and childcare work is seen as unpaid labour, and coupled 
with the bias that exists in their access to skills training they are prepared to work for 
less just to ensure that the household gets a little extra money.  
 
                                                   
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid p7. 
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(2) An alarming 8% of workers supplied by the ‘bakkie brigade’ are children. Just as the 
abovementioned gender discrimination with regards to wages still exists on farms, so 
does the incidence of utilising child labour also persist. Children below the age of 18 
often abandon school, and are then encouraged to add some money to the household 
earnings. In commercial farming conditions they may well encounter hazardous working 
conditions, long hours and the inevitable physical or verbal abuse from older workers. 
Unscrupulous labour brokers are consequently complicit in this exploitation and 
therefore require far stricter control measures imposed upon them. 
 
This research also confirmed another very disturbing development that has evolved 
along with the use of ‘bakkie brigade’ labour brokers, in that the historical power 
imbalances that underpinned the apartheid era worker-farmer relationships have been 
perpetuated in this broker-farmer relationship. The over supply of readily available 
unskilled labour on the brokers side, and the farmer’s ability to summarily dismiss any 
temporary worker has unfortunately, clinically undermined all of the upliftment ideals 
contained in our current labour legislation.  
 
My own original research41 whilst preparing this paper, involved face to face interviews 
with five labour brokers (three of whom were well established, registered labour broking 
firms, and two ‘bakkie brigade’ operators), thirty one workers from across this spectrum 
of brokers, three viticultural consultants, three wine farm owners and two labour law 
consultants based in Cape Town and Stellenbosch. 
 
Predictably, an enormous chasm exists between the services and benefits that the 
established brokers offer their employees, and the way in which the ‘bakkie brigade’ 
brokers exploit and abuse those people that work for them. The established brokers 
                                                   
41 See attached Employer data sheet, Employee data sheet and Research Findings documents that 
summarise how this research information was obtained, and what the headline findings were. 
Un
ive
rs
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
19 
prefer to utilise a fixed term (one week, two week, one month etc.) or project based 
(planting two hectares of poles, pruning three hectares of Cabernet etc.), description as 
the basis for each contract. As discussed in section 5(1) all the necessary employee 
registrations are put in place and the broker and clients joint liabilities are identified and 
agreed upon. Whilst this adherence to all the current legal requirements substantially 
increases these employees employment security, this research still identified a number of 
crucial areas that need to be addressed. These include the lack of accumulated paid leave 
privileges and maternity benefits, the continued threat of summary dismissal, and the 
absence of both an effective collective bargaining structure, as well as a longer term 
social security programme. The provision of free housing, water and electricity to 
permanently employed farm workers (who live on the farm) was one of the key 
differentiators (and leverage providers) that distinguished this sector of employees from 
most others. Unfortunately the number of workers living on farms has steadily decreased 
over the past 10 years. (A detailed explanation for this dynamic is provided in section 
7(3).) 
My own findings in terms of how ‘bakkie brigade’ brokers operate, and the litany of 
complaints that their workers have, was mirrored by the findings of the research 
published by the Centre for Rural Legal Studies. (viz a viz: There is on-going gender 
discrimination, no minimum wage guarantee, and no sick pay / rainy day / severance / 
accumulated leave or maternity pay. None of the workers are registered for UIF or 
Workmen’s Compensation either.) The over riding sentiment amongst all the people 
who worked for this ‘bakkie brigade’ was one of desperation – whilst they knew that 
they were getting a ‘raw deal’ they also knew that any number of their unemployed 
neighbours would jump at the chance to replace them.  
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Section 6: An overview of the farmer’s role in managing seasonal or 
part-time labour requirements. 
 
During the cold wet winters, whilst the vines are growing, the farmers will always need 
far fewer workers than when harvest time comes round early in the New Year and a 
frantic rush ensues to pick everything before it starts to go rotten. Immediately post 
harvest its quiet again for a couple of months until the pruning season arrives, and then 
once again there’s a limited window period during which all the pruning has to be 
completed.  
 
These seasonal fluctuations in any farmer’s labour requirements are a reality, and are 
precisely the reason why the casualisation of labour has become such a growing trend in 
the agricultural sectors of countries across the world. Casualisation allows for the 
requisite workforce flexibility, and simultaneously alleviates the farmer from some of 
the more onerous legal obligations that most standard contracts of employment would 
bind them. (Whilst also providing a quantifiable cost saving in most cases.) 
Unfortunately it has also become the accepted norm in most countries that part-time 
workers are paid an hourly, or piece-meal,42 rate but are excluded from the extended 
range of benefits and social security privileges normally afforded to permanent 
employees - hence their vulnerability to summary dismissal, lack of compensation for 
injury and no prospect of leave pay. 
 
                                                   
42 Piece-meal refers to payment that is related directly to work performance – e.g. being paid per basket of 
grapes picked, or per row of vines pruned. 
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A large number of farmers also believe that migrant labourers43 are preferable to local 
labourers since they do not have established networks within the local area, and are 
generally less assertive when it comes to demanding specific working conditions and/or 
rights. This lack of collective bargaining power undermines all workers in South 
Africa’s agricultural sector. 
 
However, the pivotal role played by most farmers within this labour broking scenario is 
that they simply abdicate all responsibility for the protection of their part-time workers 
rights. Even the local research undertaken by the Woman on Farms Project44 highlighted 
the fact that ‘farmers agree that massive potential exists for the abuse of workers.’45 
Most farmers unfortunately just turn a blind eye to this on-going exploitation and 
thereby exacerbate the problem. 
 
The obvious question therefore is whether or not a system can be successfully 
implemented that enforces both stricter controls and joint liability. Or do we simply ban 
labour brokers outright? The following analysis of the key issues surrounding this debate 
should help us in finding a way to resolve this ‘regulation versus banning’ dilemma.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
43 The United Nations definition of migrant labourers includes anyone working outside the borders of their 
home country, as well as anyone who has moved within the borders of their country to pursue work, such 
as seasonal work. 
44 See details on www.wfp.org.za.  
45 www.crls.org.za Briefing Paper: Going for Broke. (2008)  p37. 
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Section 7: ‘There are some really important questions that need to be 
asked, and answered, before banning labour brokers.’46 
 
(7.1) Does labour broking substitute and subvert the supply of decent jobs?  
On the one end of the scale, labour broking has been likened to ‘….a social ill. It’s 
the same as HIV and Aids or crime and corruption. It’s an arrangement made to take 
advantage of the weak and the most vulnerable in society.’47 
 
And then on the other end of the same scale, the ILO believe that labour broking can 
be an important service when properly regulated,48 and that private employment 
agencies play an important role in the functioning of contemporary labour markets.49  
 
The reality is that temporary workers are amongst the worst casualties of the current 
economic crisis as employers have been forced to make massive reductions to their 
permanent staff complements (almost 1 million permanent jobs have been lost in 
South Africa since January this year)50  in order to reduce their operating costs, 
thereby dramatically swelling the ranks of temporary workers. But cutting costs is 
just the first step to their staying in business. The next step demands that the work 
they need done, is done properly. Whether it’s a farmer that needs crop spraying 
done, or a manufacturing plant that can only afford to run three days a week, these are 
                                                   
46 Quote from Mr Aidan Morton, viticulturist at Tokara winery, during an interview, 21 December 2009. 
47 COSATU leader, Zwelinzima Vavi speaking on the second day of public hearings at Parliament. 
Reported in Cape Argus on 10 November 2009. 
48 ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention 181. (1997). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Rob Davis, Minister of Trade and Industry. Reported in Business Report, 2 November 2009. 
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all jobs that have to be done carefully and efficiently. They are decent work by any 
definition, and the workers tasked with doing this work are deserving of safe working 
environments, decent conditions and strictly enforced codes of conduct.  
 
Interestingly, our own South African Police Services justifies spending R121 million 
per year paying  private security guards to watch over their police stations51, because 
they have established that this outsourced labour supply is not only cheaper and less 
onerous to administer, but also frees up the trained police personnel to do their work. 
 
The reality therefore, is that there will always be a demand for outsourced, part-time, 
or seasonal, employees – the challenge is to find a way of effectively protecting these 
employees. Temporary work opportunities also undoubtedly serve as a stepping stone 
into first-time employment, and consequently need to become an integral part of any 
job creation strategy. This need for ‘regulated flexibility’52 has been widely 
acknowledged by both business and government, and is said to have informed all 
parties during the development of both the LRA and BCEA. 
 
Unfortunately, most atypical employment contracts, in their current form, are unable 
to offer the same level of socio-economic support and protection against unfair labour 
practices, that permanent or fulltime employment contracts can - and the increasing 
incidence of ‘permanent temps’53 is  strong evidence that unscrupulous labour brokers  
                                                   
51 Confirmed in Parliament by then Minister of Safety and Security, Mr. Nathi Mthethwa. Reported in 
Business Day on 28  August 2009. 
52 Cheadle, H. ‘Regulating flexibility. Revisiting the LRA and BCEA.’ DPRU (Working paper 06/109.) 
53 Temporary or part-time workers who have their contracts repeatedly renewed, or are simply never 
advised of when their specific job will come to an end. There are many instances where these ‘temps’ end 
up working for the same client for years on end, without receiving any of the social security, leave pay 
and/or incentives offered to permanent employees.  
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will manipulate this system in order to satisfy their own profit motives. These 
workers find themselves in a situation where the broker and client simply extend, or 
renew, the workers contract for an indefinite period. This is nothing more than a 
crude and blatant attempt at exploiting the specific legal protection offered in section 
198 of the LRA, and an attempt at evading compliance with the full ambit of the 
LRA. 
 
As opposed to the kneejerk reaction of simply banning labour brokers, the more 
challenging task facing our current government is to structure a formal policy on 
‘decent work’ job creation. We have to find a way to turn around the ‘jobless 
economic growth and increasing economic marginalisation of the poor’54 that has 
characterised the past 10 years of our economic performance. The fact is that almost 
seventy five percent of our unemployed people are under the age of 3555. This means 
that improved skills development programmes aimed at both employed, and 
unemployed, workers is clearly the most constructive way that the labour movement 
will be able to strengthen its bargaining power. This way some of the 13,4 million 
people who currently receive monthly social grants will have a more realistic chance 
of finding ‘decent work’ employment.56  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
54 Paper prepared by Dr. Zoleka Ndayi, entitled, ‘Global economy prohibits development state take off.’ 
(November 2009.) Published in Business Report. 
55 Labour Force Survey – September 2005. (p 39). 
56 Statistic quoted by Stanlib Chief Economist, Kevin Lings. Reported in Business Report, 5 November 
2009. 
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(7.2) Does labour broking deny workers their constitutional right to collective 
bargaining? 
 
The Bill of Rights contained in our Constitution dedicates section 23 to the protection 
of labour relationships, and includes in section 23 (2) that every worker has the right 
to (a) form and join a trade union, (b) to participate in the activities and programmes 
of a trade union; and (c) to strike.  
 
South Africa has also ratified a number of key ILO Conventions that deal specifically 
with rights to collective bargaining for workers who are employed beyond the 
boundaries of standard employment contracts;  
                                                        - Convention 87 of 1948,57 which guarantees the 
rights of workers and employees, without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.  
                                                        - Plus, Convention 98 of 1949, which gives 
workers the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. 
                                                        - As well as confirmation of the Freedom of 
Association of the Governing Body of the ILO that the criteria for determining 
collective rights is not based on the existence of an employment relationship, and that 
self-employed workers should also enjoy the right to organize.58  
 
 
                                                   
57 Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. 
58 Paper entitled, Informal work and Labour rights, delivered by Paul Benjamin at 2008 Conference: The 
Regulatory environment and its impact on the nature and level of economic growth and development in 
South Africa. 
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We have clear evidence that the potent combination of an ever increasing trend 
towards casualisation and externalisation of our labour markets on the one hand, 
complemented with the installation of what can be accurately described as 
protectionist labour legislation on the other hand, has undeniably bolstered the rise in 
labour broking in South Africa. In fact, over 70% of all registered labour broking 
businesses were only established after 1996.59 (Spurring the belief that the LRA – 
section 198 in particular - in fact provided the stimulus for the growth of an industry 
that allowed workers services to be negotiated on a purely commercial basis.)  
 
Ironically, even the current government (whose tripartite alliance partners are the 
most vocal and vociferous supporters of an outright ban on labour brokers) have 
admitted to utilising the services of labour brokers to the tune of nearly R124 million 
during the past financial year. In fact, government departments across the country 
have hired 510 employees from labour brokers in order to assist with various projects, 
and fill gaps arising from permanent employees who were on maternity or sick 
leave.60 
 
It has been repeatedly estimated that this R26 billion a year industry contributed more 
than R3, 5 billion in taxes during 2008,61 and has more than 500 000 registered 
members.  
 
                                                   
59 Statistic provided by CAPES. (Confederation of Associations in the Private Employment Sector.) 
60 These figures were confirmed by a number of Departments, including those of Justice, Agriculture, 
Health, Social Development and Transport, in written replies to parliamentary questions regarding the use 
of labour brokers. Reported on www.iol.co.za – Big state use of labour brokers – 19 October 2009. 
61 These figures were confirmed during the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee (PPC) hearings, held on 25 
and 26 August 2009. Reported by the Association of Personnel Service Organisations (APSO) on 11 
October 2009. 
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The counterbalance to this well documented growth is that there is a real concern 
regarding the marked decline in trade union membership in South Africa over the past 
18 months. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) lost 48 000 members (and 
R2 million in monthly subscription fees) between December 2008 and June 2009.  
The National Union of Mine Workers (NUMSA) has acknowledged the loss of 60 
000 members over the past year, and COSATU’s clothing and textile affiliate, 
SACTWU has seen 25 000 members disappear during a similar period.62 Renowned 
sociologist, Professor Sakhela Buhlungu, author of Trade Unions and Democracy: 
COSATU Workers Political Attitudes in South Africa (HSRC Press, 2006), believes 
that COSATU’s narrow focus on the public sector is the primary reason for this 
decline in paid up membership. He believes that the retail sector, services 
environment (e.g.: tour operators), hospitality industry (e.g.: waitrons), domestic 
workers and farm workers in particular are all categories of workers that COSATU 
has effectively ignored.63 
 
 
Trade unions, on the other hand, will rightfully argue that although the labour broker 
is the employer, he/she is seldom at the place of employment and it is consequently 
extremely difficult to centralise any collective action. On top of that the broker’s 
ability to effect summary dismissals undermines the workers ability to establish 
bargaining councils, and thereby further entrenches the inequality in bargaining 
power between the broker and the workers.  
 
The effective implementation therefore of a comprehensive registration requirement 
for labour brokers would surely alleviate some of these communication problems 
                                                   
62 All these figures were confirmed by COSATU President Sdumo Dlamini in an interview with the Mail 
and Guardian on 26 September 2009. 
63 Reported in the Daily News, 18 September 2009. 
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between the union officials and temporary workers, and consequently make it a lot 
easier for these workers to effect their constitutional right to collective bargaining. 
They are, after all, entitled to it, they deserve it, and it would undoubtedly further 
underpin their right to fair labour practices.  
 
 
 
(7.3) Do labour brokers erode the base of permanent employees? 
 
Unemployment figures are notoriously difficult to accurately quantify. The narrow 
definition for unemployed people includes those members of the ‘economically active 
population’64 that have not worked for seven days prior to any survey, plus those that 
want to work and are available to start work immediately, as well as all those that 
have taken active steps to look for work or start some form of self employment.  The 
broader definition of unemployment includes all the people described above, as well 
as all those discouraged work seekers who are no longer looking for work. Getting 
accurate figures for these disparate groups of people spread out all over the country is 
extremely difficult. 
 
Despite some intense debates and disagreements, it is now fairly widely accepted that 
we have an ever increasing unemployment problem in South Africa. During the first 
decade of post apartheid governance (1995 to 2002) the official unemployment rate 
increased from 18% to 31%. (And when including the broader definition outlined 
above, this figure rose to in excess of 40%.)65 Throughout this period whilst the 
                                                   
64 All those people between the ages of 15 and 65 who are willing and able to work. 
65 Bhorat, H. Ravi Kanbur, S.M.  Poverty and Policy in Post Apartheid South Africa.  HSRC Publications.  
(2006) p145. 
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general economy was growing, this growth was just not able to create sufficient job 
opportunities for all the new job seekers coming into the market each year, and so the 
term ‘jobless growth’ was coined.  
 
We do need however to bear in mind that all these figures excluded any reference to 
the informal sector. (Or ‘second economy’ as Thabo Mbeki preferred to call it.)  This 
ever expanding group of marginalised people, of which the vast majority provides 
fairly labour intensive services to small scale unregulated businesses, made little 
contribution to the countries G.D.P. and remain extremely difficult to monitor.    
 
The growing need for flexibility in the workforce, coupled with a growing ambit of 
new labour legislation66 saw the rise in casualisation, temporary work and fixed term 
contracts in place of permanent employment. (This was, and remains, a global trend.) 
Labour broking is a primary example of this attempt by employers to both gain 
flexibility, and reduce the administrative burdens associated with managing 
permanent employees. Not surprisingly, labour broking is often accused of replacing 
secure jobs with temporary and casual forms of employment.  
 
The current Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana, is even more forthright and has 
been quoted as saying that labour broking is, ‘….is an extreme form of free market 
capitalism which reduces workers to commodities that can be traded for profit as if 
they were meat or vegetables.’67 
 
                                                   
66 Including specifically the Labour Relations Act (66 of 1995), Basic Conditions of Employment Act (75 
of 1997), Employment Equity Act (55 of 1998) and the Skills Development Act (97 of 1998).  
67 Reported on www.apso.co.za - Workers against labour brokers – COSATU’s protest plans. Accessed on 
6 November 2009. 
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A somewhat less emotive response might be that labour brokers simply allow 
prospective employees to interact with prospective employers across both the private 
and public sector. Whether they are highly skilled IT specialists, or unskilled grape 
pickers, they allow employers to cope with seasonal fluctuations and/or unexpected 
workload demands, whilst allowing people who are not working, to demonstrate their 
skills. 
 
The overriding issue at hand is to try and determine whether or not current sections of 
our labour legislation need to be adapted, or completely overhauled, in order to both 
acknowledge this expanding informal workforce, whilst simultaneously providing it 
with appropriate social security benefits. 
 
It is however very important to remember that even well meaning and carefully 
thought out legislation can result in unexpected and socially-economically disastrous 
consequences. A recent example in our own agricultural sector is worth noting. 
 
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 199768 was specifically designed to 
prevent farm workers, and their wives and children, from being unfairly or arbitrarily 
evicted from their homes. Amongst other proviso, this Act required the farmer to 
obtain a lawful court order before effecting any eviction. It also gave woman 
occupiers the same rights as men occupiers69, and included specific rights for long 
term occupiers. (i.e. Workers over the age of 60 with more than 10 years service, or 
those who became disabled during their employment were entitled to stay in their 
                                                   
68 Commonly referred to as ESTA. 
69 Precedent was established when the Land Claims Court found that Mary Hanekom, and her family, 
were entitled to stay on in the house on the farm, after her husband had been fired by the farmer. (Note: 
Mary Hanekom was still a full time employee on the farm.) Ref: Conradie v Hanekom & another (1999) 
(4) SA 491 (LCC). 
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house for the rest of their life.)  This legislation was clearly intended to protect an 
extremely marginal and vulnerable sector of society. However, the farmer’s 
instinctual reaction was to feel threatened, and so they simply stopped replacing any 
permanent workers who get dismissed. (Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
farmers have in fact demolished these houses each time that they have managed to 
dismiss and evict the occupier.) The nett result has seen nearly one million people 
evicted from farms between 1993 and 2004.70  That was clearly not the intended 
consequence.   
 
The question we need to investigate is, how much has our new Labour Relations Act 
(Act 66 of 1995), and section 198 (temporary employment service provisions) of this 
Act in particular, affected recruitment and employment patterns amongst South 
Africa’s farmers. Has it indeed been the unintended stimulus for these employers to 
reduce the number of ‘permanent’ workers that they employ, and replace them with 
‘non permanent’ workers? 
 
The answer is an unequivocal ‘Yes’. There are significantly less farm workers living 
and working on farms. In fact some 247 000 permanent jobs have been lost on 
commercial farms since 1990.71Unfortunately, accurate figures pertaining to seasonal 
and temporary workers are notoriously difficult to ascertain, but the fact that our 
agricultural output has expanded so dramatically (exports have risen from $1,7 billion 
to  over $3,5 billion from 1992 to 2004)72 is tangible proof that there is an ever 
growing number of labour brokers servicing the labour requirements of farms across 
the country.  
 
                                                   
70 Survey conducted by Nkuzi Development Association and Social Surveys Africa – see www.wsws.org.  
71 Tangerman, S. OCED Review of Agricultural Policies. – South Africa. OCED Publishing (2006) p52. 
72 Ibid p59. 
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Our existing labour law rightfully places fairly onerous demands on employers when 
it comes to the dismissal of an employee, (as defined in sections 186 to 197B of the 
LRA) which in turn does make some employers reluctant to employ permanent 
employees. Labour broking clearly eases these restrictions. Testimony to this 
assertion is that the number of registered ‘temporary employment services’ has tripled 
since 1996.73 
 
The focus of this debate should perhaps not be centered on what has happened to the 
number of ‘permanent’ employees we have in South Africa, but rather what 
opportunities are being created for those people without employment. Elias Monage, 
President of CAPES,74  believes that the TES industry is perfectly positioned to 
provide employment security over job security. He says that they have records which 
show that anything between 15% and 32% of the 500 000 temporary workers 
employed on any one day of the year manage to secure permanent employment each 
year. 75He consequently believes that the TES industry is in fact a channel for the 
unemployed into the formal labour market. That may well be true in the commercial 
and industrial sectors, but there is no evidence whatsoever that this dynamic exists in 
the agricultural sector. (As evidenced by the OCED research mentioned above.) 
 
Access to flexible labour is a given component throughout global economies and the 
TES industry is growing consistently in both developing countries (India, Brazil and 
Mexico), as well as those highly cyclical commodity producing countries like 
                                                   
73www.polity.org.za quote from article authored by Greg Palmer (Webber Wentzel & Associates) on 16 
March 2009. 
74Confederation of Associations in the Private Employment Sector. 
75Extracted from a paper delivered by Mr. E. Monage, and entitled, ‘Call for ban on temporary 
employment services / labour brokers threatens 500 000 workers. ’ Available on www.capes.org.za  
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Canada, Australia and New Zealand76. South Africa’s agricultural sector is one of 
these highly cyclical commodity producing sectors and is unsurprisingly also seeing 
the continued growth of Temporary Employment Services. 
 
 
 (7.4) Would an outright ban on labour brokers be unconstitutional? 
In order to thoroughly evaluate this assertion we need to focus our attention on four 
key sections of the Constitution – namely Sections 9, 22, 23 and 36. 
 
Section 22 of our Constitution guarantees that ‘every citizen has the right to choose 
their trade, occupation or profession freely’ which clearly makes it unconstitutional 
to ban labour broking in its entirety. (This assertion is based on the belief that labour 
brokers are legitimately entitled to ‘citizens’ rights.)  
 
Section 23 of the Constitution in turn guarantees everyone’s right to fair labour 
practices, and includes workers rights to join trade unions, participate in strikes and 
engage in collective bargaining. It’s important to note that the definition of ‘workers’ 
in this section of the Constitution has been given a broader context than the standard 
employee definition,77 to the extent that it can even cover members of the S.A. 
Defence Force78. In section 7(2) of this essay we indicated how frustrated the existing 
unions are at their inability to engage the estimated 500 000 temporary workers being 
employed by labour brokers. The reality therefore, is that these temporary workers 
                                                   
76 Quote from Mr. J. Botha, Chief Operations Officer of CAPES, made on 3 September 2009, and 
available on www.skillsportal.co.za. (Over-engineering of S.A.’s labour broking laws.) 
77 Any person excluding an independent contractor, that works for another person or for the State and 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration, and any other person who in any manner assists in 
carrying on or conducting the business of an employer.  
78 SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
34 
are not receiving the constitutional level of legal protection provided for them in 
section 23 (2). 
 
Section 9 of the Constitution deals with equality, and specifically with the fact that 
‘Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
from the law.’79 Included in this section is the fact that ‘Equality includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedom.’80 Seasonal grape pickers, employed by 
labour brokers, do not enjoy the same level of legal protection, job security or range 
of social security benefits that permanent workers on the same farm do. This is 
evidenced by the fact that they can be summararily dismissed, are often paid less and 
seldom receive any medical or leave pay benefits.81  
 
That brings us to section 36 of the Constitution which deals with the limitation of 
rights, and requires that all rights contained in the Bill of Rights can only be limited if 
such ‘limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relationship between the 
limitation and its purpose, and less restrictive means to achieve this purpose.’ The 
constitutionality test for an outright ban on labour broking would therefore require 
                                                   
79 Section 9 (1) of the Constitution. Chapter 2 – Bill of Rights. (1996). 
80 Ibid. Section 9 (2). 
81 Patrick Craven as spokesperson for COSATU, quoted in Mail & Guardian Online – 10 April 2009. 
   (Also included in a Department of Labour research project circulated in 2004.) 
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that it could be justified as not being unduly invasive of the rights of those operating 
in the sector to continue to practice their profession.82  
 
In other words, it would have to be conclusively proven that the level and nature of 
abuses associated with labour broking could not be effectively reduced or managed 
through the enforcement of a regulatory framework.  
 
Which simply stated means that an outright ban on labour broking would indeed be 
unconstitutional, unless regulation had been effectively implemented, and failed? 
 
 
(7.5) Does labour broking ‘de-skill’ and ‘de-motivate’ the workforce? 
 
The ILO has become the worldwide guardian of the fundamental principle that 
‘labour is not a commodity.’ In June 2009 the ILO adopted a Global Jobs Pact that 
essentially, ‘calls on governments and organizations representing workers and 
employers to work together to collectively tackle the global crisis through policies in 
line with the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda.’83 Government investment in special 
employment programmes, the broadening of social protection and the establishment 
of minimum wage levels were all highlighted as key poverty reduction strategies.  
 
 
                                                   
82 Benjamin, P. Preliminary draft for presentation to “Regulating Decent Work’ Conference, Geneva 6 to    
8 July 2009. Paper entitled, ‘Untangling the triangle: The regulatory challenges of triangular 
employment.  
83 Press release published on www.ilo.org – 19 June 2009. 
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The protection of people in employment is clearly the foundation that these programs 
need to be built upon. The ILO’s Private Employment Agencies Convention,84  which 
includes all those peopled involved in triangulated employment services, are 
consequently an integral part of this definition of employment.    
 
It is interesting then to take a quick look back at how the Namibian government (who 
ratified both ILO Conventions 13885 and 18286), utilized the ILO’s ‘labour is not a 
commodity’ principle to help justify the outright banning of their labour broking 
industry  - notwithstanding any reference to ILO Convention 181.  
 
In December 2008 the Namibian High Court delivered a judgment effectively 
outlawing the entire labour broking industry. They argued that labour hire had no 
legal basis in Namibia since the common law principles in a contract of employment 
did not allow for any ‘contractual privity of a third party labour broker.’87 Whilst the 
Applicant, Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd. argued that labour hire was ‘part of a 
global trend towards more flexible forms of employment’ and that section 128 (1) of 
their Labour Act should be struck down as unconstitutional. (Their current Labour 
Act, section 128 (1) states that, ‘No person may for reward, employ any person with a 
view to making that person available to a third party to perform work for that third 
party.’)   
 
 
                                                   
84 ILO Convention 181 of 1997. 
85 ILO Convention concerning the minimum age for admission to employment. 
86 ILO Convention concerning the elimination of child labour. 
87 Article entitled , “Labour brokers under threat.’ www.poilty.org.za  16 March 2009. 
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Judge Parker responded in his judgment by saying that ‘there is no such thing as 
“triangular employment relationships” in our law.’ He said that he believed that the 
characterization of labour hire as a form of employment was ‘obfuscatory’ and had 
‘no relevance in law.’88In paragraph 29 of his judgment, Judge Parker describes third 
party profiteering from a commercial contract for the supply of human labour as 
‘offensive’ and adds that it ‘violates a fundamental principle on which the ILO is 
based, namely that labour is not a commodity.’   
 
A defence like this, based on ILO principles, unfortunately ignores the content, and 
intent, of ILO Convention 181 (1997)89 which unequivocally states that ‘private 
employment agencies play an important role in the functioning of contemporary 
labour markets …. and that labour broking can be an important service when 
properly regulated.’90  
 
Labour brokers are required to supply workers with specific skills sets, whether it’s 
for work on a construction site or seasonal farm work. These workers skills need to 
monitored and managed in order for the broker to be sure that his/her team is capable 
of completing the prescribed workload. This pressure to meet specific workload 
targets is also what keeps the workers motivation levels high, as opposed to the 
‘sheltered employment syndrome’ that prevails amongst many permanently employed 
(and often highly unionised) workers.  
 
It’s logical therefore to assume that every temporary worker needs to maintain and 
continually develop their skills base in order to sustain their commercial value. The  
                                                   
88 Quoted from paragraph 20 of the Namibian High Court judgment in the matter between African 
Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of Namibia – Case No: A 4/2008. 
89 Private Employment Agencies Convention. (1997). 
90 Mr N. Van Vuuren, Director of ILO – quoted in Business Report, 10 November 2009. 
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fact that human labour is being sold on the basis of a commercial contract (as 
opposed to a simplified bilateral contract of employment) is an ethical issue and a 
consequence of externalisation. Varying levels of legal protection have been created 
for these workers across the globe by both, their national governments, and the ILO. 
‘Poor enforcement of existing regulations is a bad reason for justifying an outright 
industry ban.’91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
91 Quote from Mr. G. Palmer on the Webber Wentzel website (www.webberwentzel.com). Accessed on 17 
December 2009.  
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Section 8: “Do we reward entrepreneurship, or do we go ahead and 
commit commercial suicide?”92 
 
The case for an outright ban of labour brokers in the winelands. 
 
An instinctive reaction to support an outright ban on labour brokers is understandable 
when one considers the widely reported levels of exploitation against farm workers, the 
gender and wage discrimination practices that are still evident93 on some farms, and the 
traceable lack of skills development94 that is afforded to so many workers within this 
sector. 
 
As detailed earlier in this paper, the simple fact that most farms have seasonal crops 
dictates that they have seasonal labour requirements. Consequently, the externalisation 
of the labour force in the agricultural sector is extremely well developed and essentially 
an integral part of the way in which this sector operates. Unfortunately, fluctuating 
global demand for our local agricultural commodities (wine, fruit and flowers in 
particular), has resulted in variable pricing and smaller profit margins for our producers. 
The farmer’s immediate reaction to these tighter margins is to find an area where 
overheads can be reduced, and labour costs are unfortunately one of the easiest (and 
biggest) costs that can be managed. Labour brokers do undoubtedly reduce overall 
labour costs on a farm, as well as a host of administrative burdens for the farmers. In 
section 5 we outlined the differences between the registered labour brokers and the 
‘bakkie brigade’ brokers that service this agricultural sector, and illustrated the marked 
                                                   
92 Quote from wine farm owner, Mr. R. Myers, during a face to face interview on 17 December 2009. 
93 Formal finding in 2007/08 joint research project undertaken by Woman on Farms and the Centre for 
Rural Legal Studies, entitled ‘Going for Broke.’ Full report available on www.crls.org.za.  
94 Ibid. 
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difference between the wages, working conditions and social security benefits available 
to workers employed by these brokers. It is crucial therefore, that any debate on labour 
broking take cognisance of these significant variations, to ensure that the frequently 
publicised ‘bakkie brigade’ transgressions are not assumed to be the normative standard 
for the entire labour broking industry. This assumption is entirely incorrect, and the 
broadly based responsibility and legal compliance shown by the registered labour 
brokers should always inform any opinion on this debate.   
 
COSATU president, Sudumo Dlamini, unfortunately believes that all labour brokers are, 
‘merciless and ungodly’95 and has even described them as criminals who specialize in 
exploiting workers.96 
 
Patrick Craven, National spokesman for COSATU, has preferred to focus his demands 
for an outright ban on labour brokers around COSATU’s shared vision for the creation 
of, ‘…quality jobs … to ensure that the millions of unemployed are able to work in 
conditions of decent work’97 and the ANC’s 2009 election manifesto that listed one of 
it’s top five priorities as being, ‘the creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods’ 
and the need to ‘address the problem of labour broking.’ 
 
The Minister of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana, has correctly drawn attention to the 
importance of two very important issues: Firstly, the workers protection from unfair 
dismissal, and secondly the permanence of their employment relationships. There is 
some logic in the argument that brokers contract people out of employment relationships 
                                                   
95 Mr. Dlamini was speaking at the labour broking seminar jointly organised by the Chris Hani Institute 
and the Young Communist League (YCL) held in Johannesburg during October 2009. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Included in the resolutions taken at the 2006 Ninth COSATU National Congress, on Jobs and Poverty 
Campaign.’ 
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and consequently undermine the workers protection. However, there does not appear to 
be any peer reviewed research, or jurisprudence, that provides concrete proof that labour 
brokers are in fact guilty of an ever increasing number of exploitative transgressions of 
the law. Almost all argument in this regard is based on anecdotal evidence which is 
simply too emotive, and statistically insignificant. Globally this externalisation of labour 
force markets has evolved and grown in tandem with the economic demands of business 
for increased flexibility. And consequently the permanence of employment relationships 
has had to be diluted in order to accommodate this demand for flexibility. 
 
COSATU believe that this continued externalisation has seen, ‘a massive deterioration 
of workers’ remuneration and benefits, rights at the workplace and income security.’98  
 
And because our current legislation allows brokers to repeatedly renew workers 
contracts without any long term commitment, the phenomenon of ‘permanent temps’ 
certainly adds some credence to this argument.  
 
The socio-economic and bargaining power inequalities that have traditionally 
underpinned employment relationships in the agricultural sector in South Africa also 
encourage one to view any atypical employment in the industry as another avenue for 
continued exploitation of these workers. Our Constitution99 makes every effort to right 
this historical imbalance by affirming the ‘democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom.’ In sections 9 (1) and 9 (2) it further defines this right to equality by saying 
that, ‘everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
from the law’ and that ‘equality includes the full and equal enjoyments of all rights and 
freedoms.’ This is probably one of the most cogent arguments against labour brokers, 
since the reality is that a large number of farm workers who are currently employed by 
                                                   
98 COSATU press release issued by Patrick Craven on 26 August 2009. Available on www.cosatu.org.za.  
99 Section 7 (1). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
42 
labour brokers do not receive the same rights or legal protection afforded to permanent 
workers employed on the same farm.100 As discussed in section 3 of this dissertation, a 
two tier labour market is well established in South Africa. Seasonal and part time farm 
workers fall squarely into the second tier of this market and are forced to ‘operate under 
an amended legal regime.’101  
 
The continued call for an outright ban on labour broking appears to be based on the 
premise that despite sufficient time102 and effort being given to proving that this two tier 
labour system can be effectively regulated, the system has proved to be inadequate. 
Large numbers of workers remain vulnerable and too many employers are allowed to 
evade the legal, and ethical, responsibilities attached to responsible employment.  
 
Proponents of the banning option also believe that most temporary jobs, currently being 
filled by labour brokers, existed previously as permanent jobs. This view is clearly 
inaccurate, when one considers the variations in demand for labour across major 
industries such as the information technology sector, the construction and manufacturing 
sector, and the agricultural industries’ seasonal crop demands.   
 
                                                   
100 Seasonal or part-time labourers generally earn less, have less protection against unfair dismissals and 
do not receive the same degree of social security benefits (housing, water and electricity) that the 
permanent workers receive. Details included in research paper: Going for Broke: A case study of labour 
brokerage on fruit farms in Grabouw. Available on www.crls.org.za.   
101 South African Foundation Report (SAF: 1996: 102 – 103.) which aimed at reducing the cost of labour 
by restricting workers rights to collective bargaining, strike action, medical provision and provident fund 
benefits. 
102 The first amendment to our labour legislation that gave to credence to labour broking was made in 
1993. 
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The well documented reality that the nature of work103, and the way in which people 
work, has fundamentally changed across the globe is undoubtedly the key driver which 
militates against a call for the outright banning of labour broking.  
 
However, those relatively unskilled and semi-literate people who are currently being 
placed on farms by labour brokers would certainly find it significantly more difficult to 
secure any form of other employment if they had no access to labour brokers. On top of 
that, the lack of unionisation in the agricultural sector further reduces their bargaining 
power, and consequently it can be reasonably assumed that any outright ban on labour 
brokers would lead to an expanded ‘underground network’ of brokers.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
103 ILO Convention 181. 
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Section 9: “If we want to curb the current levels of exploitation, then 
we must find a way to enforce regulations that won’t result in job 
losses.”104 
 
Analysing the alternative to an outright ban on labour brokers in the agricultural 
sector.  
 
There are a number of potential consequences that might flow directly from an outright 
ban on labour broking; including drawn out court challenges, significant job losses, 
(within the formal market, whilst the unregulated and exploitative informal job markets 
will expand), the potential for the labour hire industry to go ‘underground’, and concern 
from foreign investors that South Africa is out of synch with global labour force 
dynamics. 
 
The unconstitutionality of a blanket ban has already been discussed in section 7(4). 
Whilst far from settled, it would appear that the limitation clause105 contained in our 
Constitution would probably lead our legislators down the path of looking at amending 
certain sections of the existing legislation, whilst simultaneously installing systems that 
demand far stricter enforcement of this beefed up ‘temporary employment service’ 
regulatory framework.  
 
‘I personally believe that an outright ban on labour broking would further undermine 
workers rights, and drive employers, particularly those in the agricultural sector, to 
                                                   
104 Quote from winery owner, Mr. Alex Dale, during a face to face interview on 18 December 2009. 
105 Section 36 of the Constitution (1996). 
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contract with independent contractors. That would mean the end of any joint and several 
liability, a dramatic increase in the marginalisation, fragmentation, and de-unionisation 
of these workers – and effectively render their protection almost impossible.’106 
 
Stricter registration procedures for all labour brokers, clarity regarding the definition of 
who the employer is, protection for these vulnerable workers from unfair dismissal, the 
extension of specific social benefits such as sick leave and unemployment grants, the 
elimination of wage discrimination and the effective implementation of a collective 
bargaining structure within this sector are therefore all key regulatory changes that could 
be introduced in order to significantly improve these workers lives without having to 
resort to an outright banning order. 
 
(9.1) Let’s begin by looking at how to install stricter registration procedures.  
The requirement that all labour brokers register their business should not be hidden 
away in section 24 of the Skills Development Act, but rather included in an amended 
version of section 198 of the Labour Relations Act. Registration of the business 
within a State defined institution (Director-General / Department of Labour) also 
needs to be supplemented with compulsory registration at the South African Revenue 
Service.  (Including owner’s personal Income Tax registration, as well as registration 
for Value Added Tax and Pay as You Earn.) Registration at the Department of 
Labour should also include a compulsory training course that ensures each labour 
broker has the appropriate business management skills, and is fully conversant with 
the administrative requirements of registering each of their own workers with the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and Workmen’s Compensation. This program also 
has to include training each broker in terms of his/her required compliance with all 
the conditions laid out in the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
                                                   
106 Quote from Mr. Jeremy Chennells (Director of Chennells Brummers & Associates) during a face to 
face interview on 29 December 2009. 
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Act107, Occupational Health and Safety Act108, Employment Equity Act109 and the 
Skills Development Act110.  
Every broker should be required to present a certified copy of this registration to 
every farmer that he contracts with. The onus should rest with the farmer to demand 
to see this registration before allowing the broker to supply any labour. Thereafter 
joint and several liability will exist between the farmer and the broker to uphold all 
employment conditions specified in the LRA and BCEA. Routine and strict 
enforcement of this registration process by a nominated representative from the 
Department of Labour is essential to ensure that all the workers on any farm, on any 
given day, are protected, and that whatever specific performance is required in terms 
of COIDA, the EEA, SDA and OHSA is also forthcoming. This way we will have 
interwoven all our own existing legislation into a mechanism that not only delivers on 
the requirements of the ILO’s Convention 181, but also on the provisions set out in 
the globally accepted Decent Work Agenda.  
 
(9.2)Clarity regarding the definition of who the employer is, and how that will protect 
workers against unfair dismissal. 
Seasonal or temporary farm workers supplied via a labour broking service will 
typically have one person (the farmer) exert control over all the work they are 
required to do, as well as the manner in which this work has to be done – whilst 
another person (the broker) will source this work for them, transport them to and 
from this job, and then pay them at the end of the week. Real problems arise when 
one or other party is expected to take responsibility for unfair labour practices or 
personal injury. Notwithstanding the fact that the farmer imposes all the day to day 
                                                   
107 COIDA – Act 130 of 1993. 
108 OHSA – Act 85 of 1993. 
109 EEA – Act 55 of 1998. 
110 SDA – Act 97 of 1998. 
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discipline and management of the workers performance, any perceived unfair labour 
practice has to be brought to the attention of the broker since he/she is deemed to be 
the legal employer111. The broker’s contract with the farmer is a purely commercial 
contract, and is measured only in terms of the amount of work that has to be 
completed, rather than the manner in which these workers should be treated. It is 
consequently not in the brokers interest to disrupt his/her relatively large commercial 
contract for the sake of protecting a single workers interests. It is far easier to simply 
‘replace’112 a worker. The continually growing unemployment rate and widespread 
lack of literacy skills amongst farm workers makes this group exceptionally 
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by brokers and farmers alike. However, within 
unionised structures, or sectors with bargaining councils, these sort of indiscriminate 
dismissals are not tolerated.113 Even under our current legislation the broker is bound 
to comply with his/her obligations as an employer, and will be forced to pay 
compensation in the event of an unfair dismissal.114  
 
However, until section 198 of the LRA is expanded to define exactly what  
‘temporary’ means in terms of the length of time that a workers’ services can be hired 
out it will remain impossible to collectively organise and/or protect against unfair 
dismissal. 
 
Paul Benjamin, drafter of the Department of Labours discussion document on labour 
broking, suggests that a distinction be drawn between temporary workers based on 
the length of their assignment. He believes that those employees who work for a 
                                                   
111 Section 198 (2) of the LRA. 
112 Brokers invariably get away with summary dismissals by placing the blame on the Client, and 
convincing the worker that he/she will soon be placed at another work place. 
113 Smith v Staffing Logistics (2005 10 BALR 1078). 
114 NUMSA obo Mahlangu and others v Abancedisi Labour Services CC (2006 1 BALR 29).  
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number of different employers for short spells of time should remain employees of 
the broker. However those employees who find themselves spending an extended 
time at one place of work are not employees of the broker anymore, but should be 
seen as employees of the Client. The imposition of simple time frame parameter like 
this would certainly go a long way towards providing clarity on who the employer is, 
and consequently provide the employees with significantly improved protection 
against unfair labour practices. 
 
 
(9.3) The provision of social security benefits to seasonal and temporary farm 
workers. 
In the formal sector, particularly amongst the larger employers, unionised workers 
have been contracted in to health insurance, provident and retirement funds. They 
have also contributed to the statutory Unemployment Insurance Fund and Workmen’s 
Compensation Fund. All these contributions to social security funds have culminated 
in a fairly significant cost to the employer. These costs (often referred to as a ‘social 
wage’) and the protective legislation around unfair labour practices are most often the 
reason given by employers for reducing their permanent work force, and relying on 
sub-contractors and labour brokers. 
The current Unemployment Insurance Act (32 of 2003) was designed specifically to 
cater for maternity, illness and unemployment benefits. Unfortunately however, only 
employees in the formal sector are able to access any of these benefits. Even its 
updated version was criticised by the Taylor Committee in 2003 for ‘catering to the 
limited requirements of a historically privileged workforce not seriously threatened 
by unemployment.’115  
                                                   
115 The Taylor Committee on Comprehensive Social Security for South Africa was a submission made by 
IDASA (Independent Democratic Alternative for South Africa) to the Social Development Portfolio 
Committee on 9 June 2003. 
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Before an effective social security safety net can be established it will have to be 
structured in a way that it includes people who are self employed, people who are in 
between jobs, people who have resigned from their job in order to study or undergo 
further skills training and those people who have moved from the formal sector of 
employment into the informal sector. In this way farm workers who are retrenched 
and forced into the informal sector will be able to receive some form of 
unemployment and maternity benefit. So too will farm workers who resign and set up 
their own small business, as well as seasonal farm workers who work for a labour 
broker. Similarly, health and safety benefits accruing from the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act (85 of 1993) would probably only become effective for temporary 
workers in the agricultural sector if the farmer were too designated as their employer.  
 
 
(9.4) The elimination of wage discrimination. 
Global trends in labour force markets have seen the acceleration of externalisation116, 
which is often referred to as the ‘commodification’117 of employment contracts.  
 
The primary characteristic that sets these atypical forms of employment apart is its 
inherent flexibility. The challenge facing labour law legislators has been to find a 
framework that can both protect the workers, whilst not impacting on the desired 
levels of flexibility. Our own Constitution (sections 9, 10, 13, 18, 22, and 23), LRA 
(sections 198 and 200A) and BCEA (sections 82 and 83A) reflect serious intent by 
legislators to create, and regulate, atypical forms of employment. This progressive 
approach to labour legislation has inevitably encouraged some employers to disguise, 
or camouflage, their working conditions in order to reduce their overall labour cost, 
whilst being able to also avoid some of the more restrictive laws and collective 
                                                   
116 Sub-contracting, outsourcing, homeworking, TES’s and franchising are all examples of externalization. 
117 Contract between two parties where the supply of human labour is given a commercial value. 
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bargaining restraints that may have been present in their sector. Invariably it is the un-
skilled and atypical workers that are most affected118 by the abuse of this very well 
intentioned ‘employment flexibility’. Unfortunately it is most often the workers wage 
packet that feels the brunt of this discrimination.  
 
The EEA is the guardian of our right to protection from any form of discrimination. 
Section 6 (1) of the EEA virtually mirrors what is contained in section 9 (3) of the 
Constitution, but adds political opinion, family responsibility and HIV status to the 
listed grounds that may not be used as forms of discrimination.  
 
Workers who have access to trade union representation, and collective bargaining 
mechanisms, will consequently be able to ensure that wage and gender discrimination 
is effectively regulated, and controlled, within the legal rights framework that already 
exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
118 Mills, S.W ‘The situation of the elusive independent contractor and other forms of atypical 
employment in South Africa: Balancing equity and flexibility.’ (2004) ILJ 1204. 
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Section 10: Conclusion – The way forward. 
 
In it’s current incarnation, TES’s have two very distinct realities. On the one hand they 
have clearly benefitted employers by providing them with both flexibility, and a 
distinctly weakened quotient of collective bargaining to have to deal with. And, on the 
other hand, they have created a mechanism that is purely a survival strategy for tens of 
thousands of unemployed workers. 
 
However, in spite of all the abusive and exploitative practices that a large number of 
labour brokers119 in the winelands currently get away with, I am still of the firm opinion 
that specific legislation changes, and effective enforcement of these changes, would be 
preferable to an outright ban on labour broking. My own research (see section 5) clearly 
indicated that the vast majority of registered labour brokers currently operating within 
this sector are legally compliant and willing to co-regulate with both national and local 
government as well as legitimate trade unions. The seasonal (and relatively low-skilled) 
nature of agricultural work will also always provide for ‘temporary’ work opportunities 
and hence the need for effective regulation. 
 
However, in order to ensure that these distinctly vulnerable workers are offered more 
employment and social benefit protection, whilst simultaneously not putting 
unreasonable financial and administrative demands on the farmers and the brokers, we 
would need to make some fundamental legislative changes, and ensure that regulatory 
frameworks are put into place.  
 
 
                                                   
119 The ‘bakkie brigade’ in particular. 
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There are essentially just three specific areas that need to be addressed.  
 
Firstly, a regulatory framework needs to be developed that can effectively register and 
manage labour brokers. Secondly, there have to be some specific changes made to our 
existing legislation in order to create an enforcement mechanism that would allow for 
the effective management of labour brokers. And finally, the joint and several liability 
between the farmers and labour brokers for their workers employment conditions will 
have to be expanded to include issues around unfair labour practices and unfair 
dismissals. This would naturally include issues such as, equal wages and anti-
discrimination measures, plus ‘temporary’ workers right to collective bargaining and 
membership of a trade union. 
 
 
(10.1) The effective registration and management of all labour brokers:  
Labour brokers should only be given an official registration certificate from the 
National Department of Labour once they have supplied their company registration 
documents, SARS details and VAT certificate (where applicable). In addition to these 
administrative requirements, their registration should also be preceded by the 
successful completion of a 5 day training program that ensures that each broker has a 
working knowledge of the labour law pertaining to temporary employment services. 
Every broker should be issued with a standard DOL120 contract that specifies all the 
details pertaining to any labour placement they wish to make. This contract would 
include details of exactly what each worker will be paid, when this payment will 
occur, and details of any deductions that may be effected. It should also specify the 
commission, or management fee, that the broker is entitled to.  
                                                   
120 Department of Labour. 
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A monthly summary of all their placements over the past thirty days should be 
submitted to a specifically appointed Labour Inspector at their local municipality. 
This employee information should include exactly how many days each worker was 
employed, what their daily wage was, as well as their UIF and Workmen’s 
Compensation registration details. These Inspectors would be required to carry out 
random, and on-going, checks on all the farms in their allocated area, and each 
Inspector would be empowered to issue summons against both the farmer, and the 
labour broker, in the event of any irregularities being uncovered. 
 
 
 
(10.2) Proposed legislative amendments. 
The definition of who the employer is, the potential imposition of a time limit on 
temporary worker assignments, the elimination of wage and gender discrimination, 
and a mechanism that will allow for the effective enforcement of labour brokers 
duties all need to be effected via legislative changes. 
 
The current confusion (as outlined in section 3 of this paper) regarding the definition 
of who the employer in a temporary employment service (TES) is, needs to be cleared 
up. The current references in COIDA, the EEA, the OHSA and the SDA need to be 
reworked so that they are consistent with what is contained in the LRA121 and the 
BCEA122. Joint and several liabilities regarding conditions of employment, unfair 
labour practices and unfair dismissals also need to be maintained between the broker 
and the farmer.  
 
                                                   
121 Section 198 (2). 
122 Section 82 (1). 
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The EEA’s unfair discrimination definitions need to include the fact that an employee 
of a TES cannot be paid less than the Clients employee whilst doing the same work. 
Section 57 (1) of the EEA123 is also arguably the simplest way forward when it comes 
to differentiating between what constitutes ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’ employment. 
The adoption of a reasonable time limit on temporary work assignments will 
eradicate the ‘permanent temps’ syndrome and provide a solid base for building a 
symbiotic bridge between the formal, and informal labour markets. 
 
The suggestion in 10:1 above regarding labour brokers being required to ensure that 
they are DOL registered, have completed the required training and committed to the 
monthly reporting duties will also need to be detailed in amended legislation. 
 
The State has already shown its willingness to intervene in sectors which are not well 
organised, or in sectors where collective power and unionisation is difficult, such as 
the agricultural sector. Their Employment Conditions Commission published in 2001 
led directly to the March 2003 introduction of a new minimum wage for agricultural 
workers.124 By 2008, despite the announcement of a second minimum wage 
determination,125 there was still an unacceptably large wage gap between permanent 
and seasonal agricultural workers. 
 
Additional legislative changes will therefore also have to include details on how the 
enforcement of labour broker’s expanded responsibilities will be effected - as well as 
details regarding the potential imposition of substantial fines, effective de-registration 
                                                   
123 ‘ …. a person whose services have been procured for, or provided to, a client by a temporary 
employment service is deemed to be the employee of that client, where the person’s employment with the 
client is of an indefinite duration or for a period of three months or longer.’ 
124 Sectoral Determination 8: Government Notice No 24114. (2 December 2002.) 
125 Sectoral Determination 13: Government Notice No 8401. (17 February 2006.) 
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and perhaps, even imprisonment sanctions that could be imposed on brokers who 
attempt to evade the new responsibilities that they have in terms of providing ‘decent 
work’ to their employees. 
 
 
(10.3) Joint liability between both the farmers and the labour brokers. 
Employment security is probably the key issue that divides permanent farm workers 
from the temporary workers. As we have indicated throughout this paper, legal 
loopholes allow temporary workers (often on indefinite assignments) to receive 
substantially less protection against unfair labour practices, and this situation has to 
be remedied.  
 
It is crucial therefore that every farmer be made aware that they are only entitled to 
contract with officially registered labour brokers. This would mean that the farmer 
would have to complete the standard DOL contract outlined above, and assume 
responsibility for checking that the broker has registered each worker for both UIF 
and Workmen’s Compensation. The farmer would then be obliged  to issue each 
worker with a code of conduct information sheet that explains exactly what hours of 
work and level of performance is expected, as well as a summary on how any 
complaints or grievances will be dealt with. This will include how any unfair labour 
practice issues will be dealt with, wage or gender discrimination concerns, restriction 
of access to collective bargaining rights, as well as concerns over dismissal 
procedures. 
 
Farm workers, whether they are on a one month assignment, or have a 15 year history 
of living on the farm, all deserve to enjoy the same level of legal protection, and 
access to basic socio-economic benefits. This will never be achieved whilst ‘bakkie 
brigade’ labour brokers are allowed to continue operating.  
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The effective registration, control and management of labour brokers will undoubtedly 
be a difficult task, but its inherent benefits will far outweigh the cumulative damage that 
an outright banning order will precipitate. A group of local farmers have already 
instituted a system that will hopefully prove this assertion.  
 
‘At Fruit SA we decided to try and take a collaborative, rather than combatative, 
approach.’126 In order to stop ‘vulnerable workers from becoming even more 
vulnerable’127all the citrus, deciduous and fresh produce farmers in the Hex Valley 
and Kouebokkeveld sat down with the labour brokers in these areas and agreed upon 
a broadly based code of conduct. Independent privatised monitors were trained and 
installed to ensure compliance from both the brokers and the farmers. Both parties 
also agreed to independent arbitration in the event of a dispute.  
 
(With a picking season looming, this is one triangulated group of employees, employers 
and brokers that could, before the end of 2010, provide some qualitative direction on the 
way forward for labour broking in the agricultural sector.) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
126 Quote from Colleen Chennells, Director of Fruit South Africa, during a face to face interview on 29 
December 2009. 
127 Ibid. 
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Final thought.  
 
The effective enforcement of some of the suggestions made in this dissertation will 
undoubtedly allow our existing legislation to provide sustainable protection for the rights 
and freedom of all South African workers involved in atypical employment 
relationships.  
 
Simply banning labour brokers would be a clear indictment of the government’s failure 
to find constructive ways of dealing with the current unemployment crisis, and ‘instead 
of creating jobs, it will destroy millions by criminalising temporary work.’128 
 
My belief therefore, is that any outright banning action on labour broking will not only 
leave the wine farmers with a distinctly sour taste in their mouths, but will also clearly 
illustrate our failure to protect one of South Africa’s most valuable assets – its working 
class.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
128 Democratic Alliance leader, Helen Zille, quoted in the Cape Times on 11 December 2009. 
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 Employee Data Sheet. 
Personal information. 
Name:     _____________________________________________________ 
Address:  _____________________________________________________ 
Gender:  __________________                            Age:           ______________ 
Job description:  ______________________________________________________ 
Employment history. 
No of year’s service:   Permanent:     ____________    Seasonal:            ______________ 
 
Employment and work conditions information.  
Supervision on site.  
Hours of work.  
Meal intervals.  
Paid overtime.  
Sick leave.  
Maternity leave.  
Compassionate leave.  
Receipt of pay slip.  
UIF membership.  
Workmen’s Compensation.  
Provident fund.  
Housing benefits.  
‘Other’ deductions.  
Notice period.  
Disciplinary code/process.  
Trade Union membership.  
 
Overall comments: ______________________________________________________      
                                            ______________________________________________________ 
                                            ______________________________________________________                                             
 
 
MKPMAR001: Private Research Questionnaire. (Dec. 2009) 
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 Employer Data Sheet. 
Company information. 
Business name:  _____________________________________________________ 
Address:  _____________________________________________________ 
Company Reg:  Yes:________No:_________  VAT Reg:    Yes:_______No:_______ 
Services offered: ______________________________________________________ 
Company history. 
No of year’s:    ______________     No of employees:  ______________ 
 
Farm Workers: Employment and remuneration information.  
Supervision on site.  
Hours of work.  
Meal intervals.  
Paid overtime.  
Sick leave.  
Maternity leave.  
Compassionate leave.  
Receipt of pay slip.  
UIF membership.  
Workmen’s Compensation.  
Provident fund.  
Housing benefits.  
‘Other’ deductions.  
Notice period.  
Disciplinary code/process.  
Trade Union membership.  
 
Overall comments: ______________________________________________________      
                                            ______________________________________________________ 
                                            ______________________________________________________                                             
 
 
MKPMAR001: Private Research Questionnaire. (Dec. 2009) 
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Overview of independent research findings. 
 
Introduction. 
I interviewed five labour brokers, approximately thirty workers, three wine farm owners, three 
viticulturists and two labour law consultants who deal specifically in the agricultural sector. 
 
 
Headline findings: Labour Brokers. 
I conducted face to face interviews with five (5) separate labour broking entities. Three of them 
were well established labour brokers that have in excess of 150 farm workers on their payroll at 
any one time. The other two were private ‘independents’ that ran their own business’s and 
employed anything between ten (10) and fifty (50) farm workers at a time. (Copies of the 
interview guides are attached.) 
The three established brokers were all VAT registered companies. The two ‘independents’ were 
both examples of the ‘bakkie brigade’ – in other words, they were both unregistered (both in 
their private or business capacity as tax payers), private individuals who owned their own 
transport and had some previous experience of working on farms. They lived in informal 
settlements, and sourced all their workers from similar settlements within a distance of no more 
than 2 or 3 kilometers. 
Established Brokers: All three companies (The Workforce Group, Industaff Solutions and 
Grabouw Labour Bureau) were 100% compliant with current labour law requirements. Every 
worker was registered for UIF and paid above the minimum wage. The farmer (Client) was 
presented with weekly time sheets that indicated each workers hours of work, productivity and 
‘take home’ wage. On –site health and safety regulations were in place, and ablution facilities 
were always provided for their workers. They had all retained in excess of 80% of their 
workforce over the past year, and each was growing their worker base by between 10% and 23%.  
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Independent brokers: Both ‘bakkie brigade’ brokers were coloured males with only secondary 
school education.  Neither of them had registered their business. They simply offered part time 
work to people who lived in the same informal settlements that they lived in, and provided no 
guarantee to these people other than that they would receive R60.00 for each full day that they 
worked.  
 
 
Headline findings: Workers. 
Workers with the established brokers: Most of these workers had fixed term contracts. These 
contracts varied in length from one week to three months, and each was task specific. The 
workers interviewed were generally happy with their situation, but there was still a marked 
resentment that the ‘permanents’ whom they worked alongside, still received more benefits. (eg: 
child care, housing, water, electricity, sick leave, maternity benefits, farm shop savings and 
better medical care.) Interestingly, provident funds and pensions were not regarded as 
particularly important. It appears that they generally believe that the State, and their own 
children, will always look after them later in life. 
Workers with the ‘bakkie brigade’: Without exception these workers all said that they accepted 
this form of employment only because they had absolutely no other options available to them. 
They were extremely jealous of their permanent counterparts, and highlighted wage 
discrimination as their primary concern. Overall the findings amongst this group were in line 
with the Centre for Rural Legal Studies’ recently published research, ‘Going for Broke: A case 
study of labour brokerage on fruit farms in Grabouw.’  
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Headline findings: Wine farm owners. 
All three farmers utilised the services of labour brokers and agreed that effective regulation of 
these brokers was essential. “I’ve got enough problems just growing and selling this fruit that I 
don’t need my workers to add to my problems” probably sums up the common motivation 
amongst these farmers to support labour brokers. Because each farmer employs a certain number 
of permanent employees, who are housed on the farm, each was relatively ‘au fait’ with current 
labour law. They all preferred the broking service to provide a foreman/supervisor with their 
temporary work crew so that the day to day control and discipline of these workers was easier to 
manage. They also all confirmed that the overall ‘cost to the farm’ of their permanent workers 
exceeded what they paid their temporary workers. (This was however, due to the housing, sick 
leave, maternity, provident fund and child care benefits that these permanents received in 
addition to their daily wage.) Whilst the farmer’s seasonal workload demanded that they have 
flexibility in their workforce management, they were interestingly enough not really aware of the 
inherent differences between a labour broker and an independent contractor. Whenever the issue 
of joint and several liability was raised they unanimously assumed that the broker bore all that 
sort of responsibility. (And unsurprisingly, they all hoped that any enhanced regulation of 
brokers in the future wouldn’t alter this status quo too much.)  
 
 
 
Headline findings: Viticulturists. 
I interviewed three viticulturists who all act as consultants to various farms, but are each 
responsible for the quality of work that is done on the farms. These consultants advise on the day 
to day work required on each farm, as well as future plantings and the longer term development 
of the farm. They consequently have an enormous interest in the labour function of the farm. 
Two of these consultants (Chris Keet and Bob Hobson) were agreed that stricter enforcement of 
seasonal workers rights and tighter controls on the ‘bakkie brigade’ brokers was essential. The 
third viticulturist, Aidan Morton, was an avid supporter for an outright ban on all labour brokers 
and independent labour contractors. He had all six farms that he consulted to, in agreement that 
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‘fixed term contracts’ be offered by the individual farmer to each individual worker. These 
temporary workers were only employed if they had an ID book, a bank account (all remuneration 
was done via EFT payments), and a means of getting to and from the farm every day. The farm 
manager/foreman then ran a very simple payroll software system that kept track of the hours 
worked, payment due and time still to run on their contract. (eg: pruning contracts might be 
anything up to three months in duration whilst planting or canopy specific work was often done 
on a week to week basis.) He assured me that each farm had very quickly built up a strong core 
of reliable and capable workers, so whilst there was an increased ‘admin’ burden for each 
farmer, the quality of the work done on the farm was far superior to what ‘casuals’ had ever 
done. 
 
Headline findings: Labour law consultants. 
Without hesitation, both practitioners were against the banning option. They agreed that the 
‘nature of work’ has fundamentally changed and that specific sets of rules were required for 
specific types of employment. They believed that banning labour brokers would simply lead to 
further casualisation within the workforce, increased marginalisation and further fragmentation 
of the workers ability to negotiate. The consequent reliance on independent contractors would 
see workers rights diminished even further. They agreed that the ability of the State to provide 
legal protection for these rights clearly demanded stricter controls and enforcement. Both were 
agreed that the current legislation, whilst of noble intention, needed to be expanded in order to 
address issues such as wage discrimination and protection against unfair dismissal. 
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